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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Richard Carter and his wife, Carol, appeal and argue that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior United States Circuit Judge for 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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the district court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Exxon Company USA on their Petroleum Marketing 
Practices Act1 claim and on Exxon's state law counterclaim. 
They also contend, with respect to their state law contract 
claims, that the district court erred in instructing the jury, 
in interpreting and analyzing for unconscionability 
disclaimers in their franchise agreement with Exxon, in 
barring recovery of any damages that accrued after their 
franchise agreement was not renewed, and in holding that 
a jury finding was not against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Exxon cross appeals, contending that the district 
court erred by applying the disclaimers to only one of the 
Carters' contract claims and abused its discretion by 
granting the Carters leave to amend their complaint. We 
reverse the grant of summary judgment on the Carters' 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act claim and on Exxon's 
counterclaim. We conclude the district judge erred in 
instructing the jury on waiver and reverse the judgment on 
the Carters' state law contract claims. We affirm the district 
judge's holding that the contract disclaimers do not bar the 
Carters from recovering business loss on one of their 
contract claims and affirm the district judge's holding that 
the Carters may not recover, on their contract claim, 
business loss occurring after their franchise agreement was 
not renewed. We remand for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion. 
 
In 1986, the Carters began operating an Exxon service 
station in Wrightstown, New Jersey. Carter had previously 
been in the trucking business, but planned to make the 
service station his only business. The Carters formed a 
corporation, Forsum, Inc., for the purpose of operating the 
station. Because Exxon did not own the real property where 
the station was located, Carter entered into a lease with 
Thomas and Alma Davis, the owners of the real property. 
From the inception of the franchise, the Carters and Exxon 
discussed the possibility of upgrading the station or 
rebuilding the station (the "hi-grade" plan), but this never 
materialized. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The relevant provisions of the Act are codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 2801- 
2806 (1994). 
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Carter renewed the franchise on July 20, 1989, effective 
through August 1, 1992. The renewal was memorialized in 
a "Sales Agreement" and a "Rental Agreement." The Sales 
Agreement had a provision disclaiming consequential 
damages, and the Rental Agreement had a provision 
disclaiming damages, including loss of business resulting 
from repairs performed on the loaned equipment. 
 
In late September 1990, the Carters reported a leak in 
the "plus" tank, one of three underground gasoline storage 
tanks. Exxon, which owned and was responsible for the 
tanks, confirmed the leak and sent out a work crew to 
perform the repairs. On October 15, 1990, the work crew 
emptied the "plus" tank to test the repair. On October 18, 
1990, the buoyant force of ground water forced the tank to 
emerge from the ground, which in turn caused the 
"supreme" tank to take on water.2  During the repair of the 
"supreme" tank, it too emerged from the ground causing 
damage to the "regular" tank. After two weeks in which the 
Carters were left with no operational tanks, Exxon repaired 
the "regular" tank, but the Carters were left with only one 
working tank for nine months, allowing them to sell only 
one type of gasoline. 
 
After the tanks surged, the Carters had several meetings 
with various Exxon employees including David O'Connor, 
business counselor for the Carters' account, Anthony 
Luciano, district manager for southern New Jersey, and 
Richard Biedrzycki, Exxon's outside counsel. In the 
meetings, the parties discussed several issues. Carter 
expressed his desire that Exxon immediately replace his 
tanks, keeping them at their old site, while Exxon 
expressed renewed interest in the "hi-grade" plan, which 
would involve replacing the tanks in a new site to suit the 
larger facility. Exxon, unable to convince Carter to agree to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Exxon engineers recognized the risk of the tanks emerging. Two 
methods of combating this risk are securing the tank with straps and 
filling it with liquid. Carter claimed that some straps were missing while 
others were broken. Also, failed communications between the work crew 
and the fire department resulted in the "plus" tank not being filled with 
water from October 16, 1990 to October 18, 1990. Carter used these 
occurrences as part of the basis for his state law claims, and the jury 
resolved these claims in favor of Carter. 
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the "hi-grade" plan, eventually decided in mid-May to 
replace the tanks in their old site, and the work was 
completed in July 1991. In bringing all three tanks to 
working order, Exxon filled them with hold-down loads of 
gasoline. 
 
After the tanks were replaced, the parties continued to 
discuss variations of the "hi-grade" plan, but also discussed 
a franchise renewal, a covenant not to sue for damages 
arising out of the tank repair, and monies Exxon claimed 
were due for various items, one of which was a charge for 
the gasoline used to refill the tanks during the repairs. The 
discussions took a turn for the worse after a stormy 
meeting on June 3, 1992, abruptly terminated by the 
Carters' attorney, Gerald Haughey. After meetings on June 
18 and July 8, 1992, the parties still could not resolve their 
differences. A critical point of dispute between the parties is 
whether Exxon, in the course of these meetings, ever 
offered the Carters a franchise renewal without conditioning 
it on their assent to other agreements including the 
covenant not to sue and investment and amortization 
agreements related to the "hi-grade" plan. 
 
The parties ultimately did not agree on a renewal of the 
franchise, and Exxon sent the Carters a termination notice 
in late July 1992. The Carters vacated the premises by the 
end of September. Exxon entered a franchise agreement for 
the same premises with the Davises' son-in-law, Wayne 
Bird. The Carters filed this lawsuit. 
 
The Carters and Forsum asserted a violation of the 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("Petroleum Act"), breach 
of contract, negligence, tortious interference with business 
relationship, and tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage. Exxon filed a counterclaim alleging 
that Carter had failed to pay Exxon monies due under their 
franchise agreement. 
 
The district court dismissed the Carters' Petroleum Act 
claims on the grounds that only Forsum had standing to 
sue under the Petroleum Act, and dismissed Carol Carter 
and Forsum's tortious interference claims. The district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of Exxon on the 
claims of violation of the Petroleum Act, negligence, 
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interference with business relationship, and interference 
with prospective economic advantage. The district court 
also granted summary judgment, as to liability only, in 
favor of Exxon on its counterclaim. 
 
The trial was bifurcated, and the case was submitted to 
the jury to resolve the Carters' breach of contract claim and 
the appropriate amount of damages on Exxon's 
counterclaim. The Carters' contract claim was two-fold. 
They alleged Exxon had breached its contractual duties by 
failing to make the tank repairs in a good and workmanlike 
manner and to make the repairs in a reasonable time. The 
jury returned a verdict on liability in favor of the Carters on 
both theories; however, the liability verdict was mitigated by 
the jury's finding that the Carters had waived Exxon's 
contractual duty to repair in a reasonable time for the 
period of October 18, 1990, to December 30, 1990. After 
the district judge made post-verdict rulings on damage 
issues based upon the disclaimers in the franchise 
agreement and accrual of damages after termination of the 
franchise agreement, the parties stipulated that the Carters' 
damages for breach of contract were $40,000 and Exxon's 
damages on its counterclaim were $40,000. This appeal 
and cross-appeal followed. 
 
The Carters argue the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the Petroleum Act claim and in 
granting summary judgment on Exxon's counterclaim. They 
further contend that the district court's jury instruction on 
waiver was erroneous, that the district court erred in 
applying the disclaimers to bar their claim for 
consequential damages for breach of duty to repair in a 
good and workmanlike manner, that the district court erred 
by barring the recovery of any damages for the time period 
after the franchise agreement was not renewed, and that 
the jury's finding that ninety days was a reasonable repair 
period was against the clear weight of the evidence. Exxon 
contends that the district court erred by applying the 
disclaimers to only one of the Carters' contract claims. It 
contends the disclaimers should also bar recovery of 
consequential damages on the Carters' claim for breach of 
duty to repair in a reasonable time. It also contends the 
district court abused its discretion by granting the Carters 
leave to amend their complaint. 
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I. Summary Judgment on Petroleum Act 
 
The Carters3 argue that the non-renewal of their 
franchise agreement violated the Petroleum Act. Congress 
enacted the statute for the purpose of protecting 
franchisees, who generally have inferior bargaining power 
when dealing with franchisors, from unfair termination or 
nonrenewal of their franchises. See S. Rep. No. 95-731, at 
17-19, (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 875-77. 
However, Congress also provided franchisors with some 
flexibility to terminate franchise relationships by delineating 
specific provisions which indicate when a franchisor may 
permissibly terminate a franchise agreement. See 15 U.S.C. 
S 2802(b)(3). The district court granted summary judgment 
against the Carters based upon such a provision. 
Specifically, the district court relied upon section 2802(b)(3) 
of the Petroleum Act which states: 
 
       [T]he following are grounds for nonrenewal of a 
       franchise relationship: 
 
       (A) The failure of the franchisor and the franchisee to 
       agree to changes or additions to the provisions of the 
       franchise, if -- 
 
       (i) such changes or additions are the result of 
       determinations made by the franchisor in good faith 
       and in the normal course of business . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 2802(b)(3). 
 
When the franchisor terminates or does not renew a 
franchisee's contract, the burden falls upon the franchisor 
to prove that it declined to renew for one of the permissible 
reasons set forth in the Petroleum Act. See Lugar v. Texaco, 
Inc., 755 F.2d 53, 56 (3d Cir. 1985); Sun Refining and 
Marketing Co. v. Rago, 741 F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1984); 15 
U.S.C. S 2805(c). 
 
Summary judgment may only be granted "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court held that Forsum, the Carters' corporation, was the 
party with standing to bring the Petroleum Act claim; we refer to the 
Carters for simplicity. 
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the 
burden of demonstrating that the standards of Rule 56(c) 
have been satisfied. See Boyle v. County of Allegheny 
Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). When a 
court is deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
"inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's 
evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's 
must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of 
North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), 
cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). The judge's function is 
not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the 
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue 
for trial. See id. (quotations omitted). If the non-movant has 
offered more than a "scintilla" of evidence, the judge may 
not discredit the non-movant's evidence even if the 
movant's evidence far outweighs that of the non-movant. 
See id. Our review of the district court's decision is plenary, 
and we use the same standard the district court should use 
in the first instance. See Patel v. Sun Co., 141 F.3d 447, 
451 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
The parties dispute whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Exxon offered the Carters an 
unconditional renewal of their franchise agreement. The 
Carters claim that the renewal of the franchise agreement 
was conditioned upon their assent to other agreements, 
including the covenant not to sue and investment and 
amortization agreements related to the "hi-grade" plan. 
Exxon claims that it offered the Carters a franchise 
agreement without any strings attached. If Exxon 
conditioned the renewal offer upon Carter's assent to these 
agreements, then the non-renewal did not comply with the 
Petroleum Act. See 15 U.S.C. SS 2802(b)(3) and 2805(f). The 
district court so stated the issue on the summary judgment 
motion. We must review the record in the light most 
favorable to the Carters and determine if there is a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Exxon conditioned its 
renewal offer upon these agreements. We are persuaded 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
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Carter testified several times at deposition that Exxon's 
offer of a franchise renewal was conditioned upon his 
assent to other agreements. In Carter's words, "[A] sales 
agreement on its own, alone, was never offered to me," and 
"[T]he way it was offered was in a package . . . if I signed 
a full release, if I put $30,000 in the building . .. ." Carter 
addressed the June 1992 time period which was crucial to 
the district court's reasoning. When asked if Exxon had 
offered him a franchise agreement before July 2, 1992, 
Carter responded "[I]n some form of package form, I believe 
so . . . ." Carter specifically defined the package as a 
general release for claims arising from the tank damage, an 
agreement to upgrade the station with $30,000 of 
improvements, an amortization agreement, and an 
agreement to clear the debt Carter allegedly owed Exxon 
from past transactions, including the gasoline used to fill 
the tanks during repair. 
 
Other evidence on the record indicates that there is a 
genuine factual issue as to whether the offer was 
unconditional. Haughey, who was present at the meeting of 
June 3, 1992, testified that Exxon was "tying" the renewal 
of the sales agreement to the damage of the tanks and had 
been doing so "from the beginning." Carol Carter testified 
that every time Exxon made an offer, the Carters were not 
free to sign only the franchise agreement. In her words, 
"You couldn't pick up one so [sic] stack and say, okay, I'll 
take this and leave the other two. They were set in front of 
you as a whole and this is what you had to decide on. You 
had to sign all three." Exxon's own employees testified that 
before June 1992, Exxon offered package deals. O'Connor 
testified that in October 1991, he communicated with 
Exxon's attorneys regarding an offer to the Carters that 
contained a covenant not to sue and an amortization 
agreement. Further, Luciano testified that Exxon offered 
Carter a deal in which Carter would receive a new franchise 
agreement, but also would have to sign a covenant not to 
sue. 
 
Moreover, the evidence cited by the district court and 
Exxon does not persuade us that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact. Both the district court and Exxon rely 
heavily on O'Connor's testimony that there were no 
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conditions placed on the June 18, 1992, offer of a new 
franchise agreement. However, that testimony is in direct 
conflict with Carter's testimony that he was never offered a 
franchise renewal with no strings attached. When the non- 
movant's evidence contradicts the movant's, the non- 
movant's must be taken as true. See Big Apple BMW, Inc., 
974 F.2d at 1363. Instead, the district court accepted 
Exxon's, the movant's, evidence as true. The district court 
and Exxon also make much of Carter's admission that on 
June 3, 1992, Exxon never explicitly stated that the offer 
was conditioned upon his assent to other agreements. 
However, as Carter's testimony shows, Exxon certainly did 
not explicitly tell him that the offer was not conditioned 
upon other agreements, as Exxon had indicated in the past. 
Carter's statement at most represents an ambiguity in his 
testimony. Ambiguities in deposition testimony are for the 
jury to resolve. See Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp., 74 F.3d 420, 
433 n.10 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 810 (1996).4 The 
district court also relied on a letter Haughey wrote on 
January 2, 1992, requesting that Exxon handle the renewal 
of the franchise agreement and the damage to the tanks as 
two distinct issues and a letter Biedrzycki wrote in July of 
1992, indicating that Exxon was treating the matters 
separately. In the district court's opinion, the letters 
showed that both parties understood that the franchise 
renewal was distinct from discussions relating to the 
damaged tanks. However, the inference the district court 
drew from the correspondence is too broad and certainly 
not in the Carters' favor. The letter only directly shows that 
Haughey was asking for the issues to be treated separately, 
and at one point in July, Exxon indicated that they were. 
It does not directly show that Exxon made an unconditional 
offer, and inferring that it does is inappropriate on 
summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Exxon also relies upon on a statement that Carter made in a meeting 
in July 1992 indicating that he had no choice but to cease operations. 
Exxon claims that this amounts to a rejection of a franchise agreement. 
Carter's statement, however, does not show that Exxon made an 
unconditional offer. Read in a light most favorable to Carter, the 
statement only shows that Carter could not continue his operations if he 
was forced to agree to Exxon's package offer--including his waiver of 
claims arising out of the tank replacement. 
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In short, the district court failed to place the events of 
June and July in context with the previous relations 
between the parties and only accepted Exxon's version of 
the events. The record, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the Carters, reveals that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether the renewal offer was 
conditional. We therefore reverse the grant of summary 
judgment for Exxon. 
 
II. Summary Judgment on Counterclaim 
 
The district court entered summary judgment for Exxon 
on its counterclaim, which alleged that Carter owed Exxon 
for purchases of gasoline under the agreement.5 The district 
court held that Carter had not contested his liability as to 
the items in question. While the court lacked 
documentation as to amounts, it found it appropriate to 
grant Exxon's motion for summary judgment on the issue 
of liability. The parties later stipulated the amount of this 
debt as $40,000. 
 
The Carters argue the debt arose almost entirely from the 
loads of gasoline used to hold the tanks down during 
repair. Luciano, Exxon's employee, testified that the 
indebtedness arose from the hold-down gasoline used for 
the three tanks. The Carters further argue that they did not 
expressly or impliedly promise to pay for the hold-down 
loads as they did not order the gasoline; thus, Exxon could 
only recover in quasi-contract, a theory of recovery Exxon 
did not allege. The franchise agreement states that 
"[Gasoline] shall be delivered by Seller to Buyer at the 
premises in the quantities ordered by Buyer." Carter 
testified that he did not order the hold-down loads. Luciano 
testified that the Carters disputed the amount of the debt. 
O'Connor testified that there was a dispute regarding 
monies allegedly due for fuel used in the tank replacement. 
Applying the standards stated above, we conclude this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Exxon also asserts that the Carters' alleged failure to pay the debt is 
a basis for granting summary judgment in its favor on the Carters' 
Petroleum Act claim. The district court did not base its grant of 
summary judgment on the Petroleum Act claim upon this debt; thus, we 
do not address it in relation to the Petroleum Act claim. 
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evidence compels the rejection of summary judgment on 
Exxon's counterclaim. 
 
III. Jury Instruction on Waiver 
 
The case went to the jury on the Carters' breach of 
contract claims, and the jury found that the Carters waived 
performance of Exxon's contractual duty to repair the tanks 
from October 18, 1990, to December 30, 1990. The Carters 
argue that the court erred in instructing the jury that 
waiver could be found based upon "inaction or silence." The 
Carters timely objected to the instruction. We must 
determine whether the jury instructions as a whole stated 
the correct legal standard. See Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 
S.Ct. 1052 (1998). "If, looking at the charge as a whole, the 
instructions were capable of confusing and thereby 
misleading the jury, we must reverse." Mosley v. Wilson, 
102 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). 
 
The breach of contract claim was asserted under New 
Jersey law, and we look to New Jersey law to determine the 
applicable definition of waiver. The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey in West Jersey Title & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial 
Trust Co., 141 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1958), held that waiver 
requires "a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party 
showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel 
on his part . . . ." Id. at 787. See also Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 
623 A.2d 272, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff 'd, 
655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995); Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Township of North Brunswick Planning Bd., 463 A.2d 960, 
962 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983). New Jersey law thus 
requires a decisive act, rather than mere inaction, as a 
basis for waiver, and we conclude the district court's 
instruction was contrary to New Jersey law. 
 
Moreover, during closing argument, Exxon's counsel 
argued that the Carters' silence in the face of the 
destruction of the tanks and Exxon's corresponding "hi- 
grade" proposal made it reasonable for Exxon to proceed on 
the proposals, rather than to start replacing the tanks. The 
district court instructed the jury that it mustfind a waiver 
if the Carters expressly agreed to or clearly acquiesced in a 
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delay of performance under the contract which reasonably 
led Exxon to believe that the Carters would not insist the 
tanks be repaired or replaced. Introducing the issue of 
Exxon's reasonable belief is also contrary to New Jersey 
law, and further compounded the error. See Petrillo, 623 
A.2d at 272, 276 (holding that it is erroneous to define 
waiver as conduct causing an objective observer to believe 
party had relinquished her rights). Including inaction, 
silence, and reasonable belief in the definition of waiver 
creates an incorrect statement of the legal standard and 
could confuse the jury as to the basis for waiver. The 
district court's instruction is reversible error. 
 
IV. Damages 
 
A. 
 
The franchise relationship between Carter and Exxon was 
memorialized in the Sales Agreement and the Rental 
Agreement. Each had a provision disclaiming damages. 
 
Paragraph three of the Rental Agreement states: 
 
       Upon written notice from the Lessee, Lessor shall make 
       all repairs to the equipment leased hereunder which 
       are not Lessee's responsibility as described in Exhibit 
       A; provided, however, that such repairs are, in Lessor's 
       sole judgment, necessary in consideration of the 
       remaining term of this agreement or have not been 
       caused by negligence or misuse of Lessee or Lessee's 
       employees, agents, representatives or contractors. 
       Lessor and its designees shall have the right to enter 
       the premises at any time to inspect, repair, or replace 
       the equipment, and Lessor shall have no obligation to 
       reimburse Lessee for any loss of business by Lessee or 
       other damages resulting from these activities by Lessor. 
 
Paragraph twenty-six of the Sales Agreement states: 
 
       DAMAGES: NO CLAIM SHALL BE MADE UNDER THIS 
       CONTRACT FOR SPECIAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
       DAMAGES, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY 
       LAW. 
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The district court held that it did not need to look to 
paragraph twenty-six of the Sales Agreement because 
paragraph three of the Rental Agreement was more 
applicable to tank replacement. After determining that 
paragraph three was not unconscionable, the district court 
held that it barred the Carters' recovery of consequential 
damages on their claim for breach of duty to repair in a 
good and workmanlike manner, but did not bar the Carters' 
recovery of consequential damages on their claim for breach 
of duty to repair in a reasonable time. Each party claims 
the district court's holding was erroneous. The Carters 
claim that both paragraph three and paragraph twenty-six 
are inapplicable, and, in the alternative, they are 
unconscionable. Exxon disputes the Carters' claims and 
further contends that the district court erred by not 
applying paragraphs three and twenty-six to the Carters' 
claim for breach of duty to repair in a reasonable time. 
Thus, we must first determine whether the proper 
interpretation of the contract bars the Carters' recovery of 
consequential damages and then determine whether the 
contract, properly interpreted, is unconscionable. 
 
Franchise agreements governed by the Petroleum Act are 
to be interpreted according to state contract law.6 See Lippo 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1985). We 
thus look to New Jersey's law of contract interpretation. 
New Jersey's fundamental rule of contract interpretation is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Rental agreements are interpreted and analyzed for unconscionability 
in the same way as contracts. We need not consider whether New 
Jersey's version of the Uniform Commercial Code applies to this rental 
agreement. On the state law issues before the court today--waiver, 
interpretation, unconscionability, and consequential damages--the 
U.C.C. analysis and the common law contract analysis lead to the same 
result. See N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 12A:2-209 (West 1962) (not defining waiver) 
and 12A:2-208 (West 1962) (New Jersey Study Comment). Compare N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 12A:2-301 (West 1962) (U.C.C. Comment) with Jacobs v. 
Great Pacific Century Corp., 518 A.2d 223, 224, 227 (N.J. 1986) 
(interpretation). Compare Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register 
Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1980) with Howard v. Diolosa, 
574 A.2d 995, 999 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (unconscionability), 
certification denied, 585 A.2d 409 (N.J. 1990). Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 12A:2-715 (West 1962) (New Jersey Study Comment) with Donovan v. 
Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165-66 (N.J. 1982) (consequential damages). 
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that the court is to ascertain the parties' intent from what 
was written and the surrounding circumstances. See 
Jacobs v. Great Pacific Century Corp., 518 A.2d 223, 224, 
227 (N.J. 1986); Tessmar v. Grosner, 128 A.2d 467, 471 
(N.J. 1957). Our review of the district court's interpretation 
of the contract is plenary. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. 
Rohm and Hass Co., 89 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 880-81 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
The parties make much of whether the Sales Agreement 
and the Rental Agreement are one agreement or two. Exxon 
argues that they are one agreement; therefore, paragraph 
twenty-six of the Sales Agreement applies to losses 
resulting from the repair of the tanks, and paragraph 
twenty-six is so broad that it does not leave room for the 
district court's distinction between manner and time of 
repair. The Sales Agreement refers to attachments, and its 
language makes evident that the Rental Agreement was an 
attachment to it. The Rental Agreement is not only entitled 
a "Rider to the Sales Agreement," but commences with 
reference to the buyer's purchase of products as defined in 
the Sales Agreement. However, whether the parties have 
one or two agreements is not determinative of the issue 
before us. 
 
Contract provisions are to be interpreted so as to give 
each provision meaning, rather than rendering some 
provisions superfluous. See, e.g., Ehnes v. Hronis, 23 A.2d 
592, 593 (N.J. 1942); United States v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Embassy 
Moving & Storage Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 602, 606 
(Ct. Cl. 1970). Exxon's reading of paragraph twenty-six of 
the Sales Agreement renders superfluous the disclaimer 
language in paragraph three of the Rental Agreement, 
which specifically addresses the parties' respective duties 
for the upkeep of the equipment and which disclaims 
business loss resulting from repair of the equipment. The 
reading of the two agreements which gives independent 
meaning to paragraph three of the Rental Agreement is that 
paragraph twenty-six of the Sales Agreement does not apply 
to losses stemming from tank repair. The disclaimers in 
paragraph twenty-six of the Sales Agreement and 
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paragraph three of the Rental Agreement apply to different 
aspects of the contractual relationship between the parties. 
 
The critical phrase of paragraph three of the Rental 
Agreement is: "[Lessor] shall have the right to enter the 
premises at any time to inspect, repair, or replace the 
equipment, and Lessor shall have no obligation to 
reimburse Lessee for any loss of business by Lessee or 
other damages resulting from these activities . . . ." The 
business loss on the breach of duty to repair in a good and 
workmanlike manner claim results from Exxon's repair of 
the equipment and is barred by the disclaimer. 
 
We believe, however, that New Jersey's contract 
interpretation principles lead to the conclusion that the 
Carters may recover business loss for breach of duty to 
repair in a reasonable time. 
 
"An agreement . . . must be accorded a rational meaning 
in keeping with the express general purpose." Tessmar v. 
Grosner, 128 A.2d 467, 471 (N. J. 1957). "[T]he most fair 
and reasonable construction, imputing the least hardship 
on either of the contracting parties should be adopted . . . 
so that neither will have an unfair or unreasonable 
advantage over the other." Id. (citations omitted). 
 
Paragraph three only bars damages "resulting from" 
repair and does not refer to failure to commence repairs or 
the timeliness of repairs. An interpretation of this language 
that allows Exxon to delay commencement of tank 
replacement and not make the replacement in a reasonable 
time is not the most reasonable or fair because it 
substantially undermines the right to repairs that Exxon 
gave Carter.7 Further, allowing Exxon an unlimited time to 
make the repairs gives it an unfair advantage in this case 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Exxon claims that it did not commence tank replacement because 
after the tanks surged, the Carters negotiated with them about making 
the "hi-grade" improvement. However, Carter testified that he told Exxon 
that he was not interested in the "hi-grade" improvement and wanted his 
tanks replaced in their old site. This factual dispute goes to the merits 
of Exxon's waiver defense, which the jury resolved by finding that Carter 
waived his right to have the tanks timely replaced from October 18, 1991 
to December 30, 1991. The waiver issue must be retried with the proper 
jury instruction. 
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where the delay could have compelled Carter into assenting 
to the "hi-grade" improvement. It is also not in accord with 
the general purpose of the agreement, the sale of gasoline. 
If Exxon truly was bargaining for exculpation from damages 
regardless of the length of time it took them to make 
repairs, it should have drafted the contract explicitly 
excluding damages for untimely repair. 
 
While the exculpatory clause in a commercial lease was 
held not to exculpate a landlord from his own negligence 
unless the clause expressly so stated, see Carbone v. 
Cortlandt Realty Corp., 277 A.2d 542, 543 (N.J. 1971), the 
principle is also applicable in this case. Exxon's delay, like 
Cortlandt's negligence, was a subject that required an 
explicit disclaimer. 
 
Considering the stake Carter had in his franchise and the 
imprecise language of the disclaimer, we are not persuaded 
that Carter agreed to incur the risk that Exxon would delay 
the commencement of tank replacement and not perform 
the required repair or replacement in a reasonable time. 
 
B. 
 
Even if we were to interpret the disclaimer as Exxon 
proposes, we would conclude the contract is 
unconscionable to the extent that it shields Exxon from 
damages resulting from its failure to repair or replace the 
tanks in a reasonable time. Unconscionability is a question 
of law for the court to decide. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:2-302 
(West 1962). In determining whether a contract is 
unconscionable, courts focus on the bargaining power of 
the parties, the conspicuousness of the putative unfair 
term, and the oppressiveness and unreasonableness of the 
term. See, e.g., Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash 
Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Division, 416 A.2d 394, 403 
(N.J. 1979) (concurring opinion). 
 
In this case, while we recognize that the Carters had 
discussions with other franchisors, there is no doubt that 
their bargaining power was substantially less than Exxon's. 
See S.Rep. No. 95-731, at 17-18, (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 873, 875-76. The Petroleum Act might protect 
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the Carters from unfair renewal decisions, but there 
remains a wide disparity in bargaining power with regard to 
other aspects of the relationship. 
 
Furthermore, the disclaimer is not adequately 
conspicuous. The paragraph is not titled, and the critical 
language limiting Exxon's liability is not capitalized or 
highlighted. Thus, there is no indication that this far- 
reaching disclaimer might be of greater importance than 
other provisions of the paragraph or the agreement. The 
lack of a title or highlighting is particularly disturbing 
because the disclaimer is buried in a paragraph which 
purports to confer the benefit of repairs made at Exxon's 
expense. Indeed, in a single-spaced paragraph, which for 
the first eight and one-half lines discusses only the duty to 
repair, it is not until the last clause of the third sentence 
beginning on the last half of the eighth line, that the 
disclaimer of liability is reached. In this respect, the case is 
similar to Jutta's Inc. v. Fireco Equipment Co., 375 A.2d 687 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), in which the court struck 
down a limitation on damages which appeared at the end of 
a paragraph conferring a guarantee. See id. at 690. While 
the paragraph in Jutta's was more deceiving because it was 
titled "Distributor's Guarantee," placing the disclaimer far 
down in a paragraph which otherwise seems to confer 
benefits, without any demarcation at all, falls short of being 
conspicuous. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:1-201(10) (West 
Cum. Supp. 1998) (describing language as conspicuous if it 
is in larger or contrasting type). 
 
Finally, the disclaimer, as Exxon would have us interpret 
it, would be oppressive and unreasonable. In some 
respects, this case is similar to Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. 
Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429 (N.J. 1987). There the 
New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether a seller's 
disclaimer of consequential damages was enforceable when 
the seller's repair warranty had failed of its essential 
purpose. 
 
Kearney adopted our reasoning in Chatlos Systems, Inc. 
v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 
1980), and held that the fact that the seller's repair 
warranty had failed of its essential purpose does not alone 
render the disclaimer of consequential damages 
 
                                18 
  
unconscionable. See Kearney, 527 A.2d at 437-38. In the 
court's words: 
 
       [New Jersey Law] does not require the invalidation of 
       an exclusion of consequential damages when limited 
       contractual remedies fail of their essential purpose. It 
       is only when the circumstances of the transaction, 
       including the seller's breach, cause the consequential 
       damage exclusion to be inconsistent with the intent 
       and reasonable commercial expectations of the parties 
       that invalidation of the exclusionary clause would be 
       appropriate . . . . For example, although a buyer may 
       agree to the exclusion of consequential damages, a 
       seller's wrongful repudiation of a repair warranty may 
       expose a buyer to consequential damages not 
       contemplated by the contract . . . . 
 
       Id. at 438. 
 
Kearney held that the disclaimer in question was not 
unconscionable as applied, considering the wide range of 
repairs possible for the complex controlled machine at issue 
and the repeated service calls made by the seller. See id. at 
438-39. 
 
In this case, Exxon did not repudiate its duty to repair. 
But, under Kearney, the issue is whether, considering the 
circumstances of the transaction and the nature of Exxon's 
breach, it is consistent with reasonable commercial 
expectations and the intent of the parties that the Carters 
bear the risk of loss of business stemming from Exxon's 
failure to repair or replace the tanks in a reasonable time. 
 
The disclaimer makes no reference to failure to 
commence repairs or the timeliness of repairs. Most 
important is the nature of Exxon's breach. Even if the 
Carters waived their right to timely tank replacement 
through December 30, 1991, as the jury found, Exxon did 
not commence tank replacement until mid-May. The 
replacement of the tanks was not completed until mid-July, 
three and one-half months longer than the jury found to be 
a reasonable time for the replacement. Absent waiver or a 
similar defense, we conclude that the substantial delay in 
the commencement of tank replacement, with a resulting 
failure to replace in a reasonable time, is the kind of 
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breach, which causes unforeseen damage, such as the New 
Jersey Supreme Court referred to in Kearney. 
 
Kearney relied on our decision in Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. 
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). 
In Chatlos, the buyer bought a computer system from the 
seller. The contract included a repair warranty and a 
consequential damage disclaimer. A year and a half after 
the sale, the system was not working properly, despite 
repeated repair efforts by the seller. The buyer sued for 
consequential damages. See Chatlos, 635 F.2d at 1084. In 
upholding the validity of the damage disclaimer against a 
claim that it was unconscionable, we stated, "[I]t is worth 
mentioning that even though unsuccessful in correcting the 
problems within an appropriate time [the seller] continued 
in its efforts . . . . This is not a case where the seller acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith." Id. at 1087. In this case, as 
we observed above, we do not see the kind of continuing 
effort to repair present in Chatlos, and the jury specifically 
found that Exxon breached a contractual obligation to 
make the repair or replacement within a reasonable time. 
 
Even assuming Exxon's interpretation of the contract is 
correct, we conclude that the application of the disclaimer 
to damages resulting from Exxon's failure to repair or 
replace the tanks in a reasonable time is unconscionable. 
We reach this decision considering the precedent of 
Kearney, Chatlos, and Jutta's, the disparity in bargaining 
power between the parties, the inconspicuousness and 
imprecision of the disclaimer, and the substantial delay in 
the commencement of the tank replacement, which, absent 
waiver or a similar defense, was inconsistent with the 
parties' intent and reasonable commercial expectations.8 
 
On their breach of duty to repair in a reasonable time 
claim, the Carters may recover business loss which, at the 
time the parties made the contract, was a reasonably 
foreseeable result of Exxon's breach and was a reasonably 
certain consequence of the breach. See Donovan v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Carters' contention that it is unconscionable for the disclaimer to 
bar recovery on the breach of duty to repair in a good and workmanlike 
manner claim is without merit. That breach does not involve the kind of 
unforeseen damages to which Kearney refers. 
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Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 1982). However, we 
affirm the district court's holding that on this breach of 
contract claim the Carters may not recover business loss on 
a hypothetical franchise agreement that would have taken 
effect after the franchise agreement expired in July 1992. 
We are persuaded that, as a matter of law, the nonrenewal 
of the franchise agreement and the lost opportunity to 
make profit on a new agreement was not a reasonably 
certain consequence of Exxon's delay in replacing the 
tanks. The delay and the ultimate tank replacement 
occurred more than a year before the franchise was not 
renewed, and during that year, the parties continuously 
negotiated for a renewal of the franchise. 
 
C. 
 
If they succeed on their Petroleum Act claim, the Carters 
can recover lost profits that would have accrued had they 
been able to continue to operate the station after July 1992.9 
See Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 660 F.2d 1380, 
1388 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982). 
The disclaimers do not shield Exxon from liability for 
consequential damages resulting from a violation of the 
Petroleum Act. In the first place, the language of the 
disclaimers does not apply to these damages. Paragraph 
three does not apply because these damages do not"result" 
from repair. Paragraph twenty-six does not apply because 
these damages are not based on a claim made "under" the 
contract. Alternatively, even if the damages were based on 
a claim made "under" the contract, 15 U.S.C.S 2805(d) 
provides for the recovery of actual damages. Thus, the 
damages would be "provided otherwise by law" in 
accordance with paragraph twenty-six's savings clause. 
Most importantly, even if the disclaimers did apply, we 
could not allow Exxon to contract away the protection 
Congress provided franchisees. See Graham Oil v. Arco 
Prod. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 907 (1995). If the Carters succeed on their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The district court did not rule on the damages available to the Carters 
on the Petroleum Act claim because the court had granted Exxon 
summary judgment on this claim. 
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Petroleum Act claim, they are entitled to actual damages 
resulting from the violation. See 15 U.S.C.S 2805(d). 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
We reverse the district court's entry of summary 
judgment on the Petroleum Act claim and Exxon's 
counterclaim. We conclude the district court erred in 
defining waiver for the jury and reverse the judgment on 
the Carters' state law contract claims. We affirm the district 
court's holding that the Rental Agreement disclaimer 
precludes the Carters from recovering business loss on 
their breach of duty to repair in a good and workmanlike 
manner claim and its holding that neither the Rental 
Agreement disclaimer nor the Sales Agreement disclaimer 
precludes recovery on the Carters' claim for breach of duty 
to repair in a reasonable time to the extent that business 
loss accrued before the franchise agreement expired in July 
1992. In view of our holdings on the waiver instruction, the 
damages for breach of contract, and the counterclaim, we 
believe it is appropriate that the entire case be retried, 
including the issue of the reasonable time to repair or 
replace the tanks. See Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 
699 (3d Cir. 1988); Heckmen v. Federal Press Co. , 587 F.2d 
612, 619 (3d Cir. 1978). We affirm the district court's 
holdings on all other issues raised. We remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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